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GOVERNANCE MODES FOR SYSTEMIC INNOVATION.  
SERVICE DEVELOPMENT IN MOBILE TELECOMMUNICATIONS  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper focuses on governance modes for systemic innovation projects. The central 
question is: to what extent does the newness of a system and its components affect the 
most appropriate governance mode for component development projects? Component 
development projects can be performed by either the system developer, the component 
developer or by some combination of these parties in a collaborative governance 
mode. This paper presents a model to determine the most appropriate governance 
mode for component development depending on the newness of the system and the 
component. We include in our model considerations of both appropriation and 
integration of knowledge. We tested the model on thirty new service development 
projects for mobile telecommunications systems. The study shows support for the 
claim that misfit between the modeled and the actual governance modes negatively 
affects the performance of component innovation projects. 
 
Keywords: governance modes, system innovation, component innovation, 
performance of innovation projects. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 A central concern in innovation projects on components of a larger system 
involves the choice of parties to be involved and the intensity of cooperation. 
Component development projects can be performed by the party responsible for the 
system as a whole, by a party responsible for the component in particular, or in some 
form of collaborative setting. This paper addresses the issue of governance modes for 
component development projects of larger systems. More in particular, we address the 
influence of the system and component newness on the governance mode of 
component innovation projects. 
 In the literature opposing views can be found on the issue of governance modes 
for innovation on technological systems. The literature on the resource-based view of 
the firm emphasizes the advantages of collaboration for systemic innovation in terms 
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of specialization, learning and flexibility (Hamel, Doz and Prahalad, 1989; 
Nooteboom, 2000). Collaboration for innovation is also advocated in the literature on 
networks and alliances (Doz and Hamel, 1997; Gulati and Singh, 1998; Hagedoorn 
and Duysters, 2002). The literature in industrial economics emphasizes the advantages 
of integrated structures from the perspectives of transaction costs and appropriation 
(Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997; Teece, 1996). Particularly, in his seminal publication, 
Teece (1986) has emphasized the importance of complementary assets as a means to 
appropriate returns on innovation, and the choice of integrated governance modes to 
produce those assets if they are not yet available in the market. Component 
technology can be considered a complementary asset from a system perspective. 
 Chesbrough and Teece (1996) and Teece (1996) have integrated these different 
perspectives in a model for governance modes for systemic innovation. According to 
these authors, innovation under high interdependency between components can best 
be performed in integrated or strong cooperative structures. In contrast, according to 
them, autonomous or ‘stand alone’ innovations with low degrees of interdependency 
can best be developed in disintegrated governance modes. 
 In this paper we develop and test a model for component innovation in which we 
take the life cycles of the system and the component into account. Our model reflects 
the view that the most appropriate governance mode for component development 
depends on the life cycles, i.e. the newness, of the system and the component. By 
including the aspect of appropriation explicitly in the model we add to the information 
processing view of organizing for systemic innovation (Brusoni and Prencipe, 2001). 
Moreover, we operationalize the concept of governance mode in a way that it 
becomes possible to systematically test the implications for different dimensions of 
performance. 
 We tested our model on the development of mobile telecommunications services. 
Mobile telecommunications services are part of the larger mobile telecommunications 
system, consisting of several components, such as mobile networks, handsets, 
protocols and the mobile services themselves. In this paper we only distinguish the 
network (the ‘system’) and services (the ‘components’). In the ‘network’ we include 
both the physical transmission networks, e.g. GSM and UMTS networks, and the 
middleware. ‘Middleware’ refers to the software and protocols that facilitate the 
operations of the network and that specify interfaces between networks and other 
components, such as handsets and services. Examples are WAP, SMS and MMS, and 
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more specific systems such as i-mode (the mobile internet service introduced by NTT 
DoCoMo in Japan). Mobile services refer to the user applications available on mobile 
networks that provide extra functionality over basic voice and data services. Examples 
are location-based services, information and entertainment services, and mobile office 
applications. The issue of this paper concerns the most appropriate governance mode 
for mobile service development projects: by the telecom operator, by an independent 
service firm, or in some form of collaborative setting. 
 This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we apply the product life 
cycle model to the system and component, and we discuss the implications for the 
characteristics of innovation projects on components. Next, we present a framework 
for a typology of governance modes for component innovation, depending on the 
newness of the system and the component. Subsequently, the research methodology is 
described, after which we test the framework on thirty development projects of mobile 
telecommunications services. Finally, we present our results and discuss the 
implications for theory and practice. 
 
A LIFE CYCLE MODEL OF SYSTEMIC INNOVATION 
 We apply the product life cycle model to systems and components. We consider a 
system to consist of a number of components united in a common architecture 
(Henderson and Clark, 1990). The interfaces between components are an important 
part of the system. Baldwin and Clark (1997) call the interfaces between components 
‘visible design rules’ versus hidden design rules within the components. System 
innovation means that the architecture or the interfaces between the components 
change. Component innovation means that one or more of the components change, 
which may involve that also the interfaces between that component and other 
components change. If clear interfaces are defined between the components of a 
system, so that component innovation does not affect these interfaces, component 
innovation is largely autonomous. 
 The product life cycle model distinguishes three phases of maturity for a product: 
fluid, transitional and specific (Abernathy, 1978; Utterback, 1994). The emergence of 
a dominant design for the product separates the fluid phase from the transitional and 
specific phase. The dominant design results from the choices of producers and 
customers and has both a technical and a functional aspect. The technical aspect 
specifies the dominant architecture and character of product elements, whereas the 
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functional aspect relates to the preferences of users regarding product features 
(Cusumano et al., 1992: p. 56). Since we will argue that the dominant design is 
important for the choice of governance mode, we distinguish only the fluid and 
mature phases in this paper, capturing the transitional phase in the mature one. 
 The phase in the life cycle of a product affects several characteristics of 
innovation projects. When a product is new, the firm(s) producing the system have to 
acquire the dominant design in the market, and, in the presence of network 
externalities, have to create an installed customer base to acquire the dominant design 
in the market (Arthur, 1988, 1989, 1996; Schilling, 2002; Shapiro and Varian, 1999; 
Teece, 1986; Utterback, 1994). Lambe and Spekman (1997) have introduced the 
concept of urgency referring to the need for the innovator to acquire the dominant 
design by developing products in a timely manner. Moreover, the newer the product, 
the higher the level of uncertainty involved in innovation. We can make a distinction 
between technological and market uncertainty as a consequence of newness (Kamien 
and Schwartz, 1982: pp. 109 ff). Technological uncertainty relates to technical 
problems in development trajectories and to technological knowledge that has to be 
generated. Market uncertainty refers to the behavior of competitors, to the number and 
preferences of customers and to substitutes that may appear. 
 The life cycle perspective can be applied to both the system and the component 
level of systemic innovation. The life cycle of the system concerns the architecture 
and the interfaces, and defines the newness of the system as a whole. The life cycle of 
a component depends on the degree of similarity to existing components of the system 
and to components of other systems.  
 In the case of mobile telecommunications systems, the network and the 
middleware define the architecture and many of the interfaces between the 
components, and thereby the system. The interfaces are not established up-front but 
develop in the course of time. Even when telecom authorities have agreed up-front on 
a de jure standard for the transmission system (Bekkers, 2001; Funk and Methe, 
2001), de facto a number of technical choices for the interfaces with components such 
as handsets still have to be made. In the course of the development of the system 
normally a dominant design for the architecture and interfaces is set, to which service 
developers can conform. We consider a new mobile service to start a new life cycle if 
it offers features unavailable by means of services on other networks or available by 
means of other channels. At this moment many location-based services are new 
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according to this criterion, because they could not be offered through other channels 
before. We consider a new mobile service to be mature if it is an extension of an 
existing mobile service, or if it is a close copy of and existing service offered by 
means of another channel. An example of the latter is an electronic telephone 
directory offered on a mobile network. This service is a close copy of and existing 
service, except for the fact that the mobile service can be reached independent from 
the location of the user.  
 The life cycle perspective makes clear that the newness of the system and its 
components affect the characteristics of component development projects. Firstly, 
when the system is new, the firm(s) producing the system will feel a high level of 
urgency to create installed base, to be able to appropriate the returns of the 
development of the system. Components are complementary assets for the 
development of the system, and so they will also feel a high sense of urgency with 
respect to component development. Urgency considerations can exist at the 
component level itself, since the firm(s) developing a completely new component for 
a mature system also has to acquire the dominant design for that component. 
 Secondly, the newness of the system and components increase the levels of 
technological and market uncertainty in component development. Newness of the 
system creates uncertainty on the interfaces between the component and other 
components, on the prospective users and their preferences. Newness of the 
component creates uncertainty on technological knowledge involved in the 
component itself, and concerning the preferences of the users of the system 
concerning the component. 
 In summary, the life cycle perspective makes clear that the newness of the system 
and the component are expected to affect the degrees of urgency and uncertainty 
involved in component innovation. Urgency will be felt most by the party or parties 
that are responsible for the newest elements, system or component. The combined 
newness of the system and component define the levels and sources of uncertainty in 
component development. 
 
Governance modes for component development 
 Based on the degrees of urgency and uncertainty, and in line with contingency 
theory (Burton et al., 2002; Donaldson, 2001; Gerwin, 2004; Naman and Slevin, 
1993; Reuer and Arino, 2002), we propose that the newness of the system and 
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component also affect the most appropriate governance mode for component 
innovation projects. We distinguish two types of parties that may be involved in 
component development: the system developer and the component developer. The 
system developer is responsible for the architecture and the interfaces of the system as 
a whole, whereas the component developer is responsible for the component. If one 
firm is responsible for both the system and the component, the system and component 
developer are identical.  
 We address two dimensions of governance modes: the involvement of the 
different parties, and the degree of integration (Robertson and Langlois, 1995. see also 
Gerwin, 2004; Gerwin and Ferris, 2004). The involvement of different parties refers 
to the division of investments between system developer and component developer. If 
the system developer does all investments in the component, the situation of common 
ownership occurs. In that case the system and component developer are identical. The 
degree of integration refers to the degree that the governance mode facilitates 
intensive coordination between system and component development.  
 We assume that the degrees of urgency and uncertainty involved in a component 
development project affect the optimal governance mode. The degrees of urgency 
experienced by the system and component developer affect the appropriate division of 
investments between system and component developer. In case at least one of the two 
parties feels a high sense of urgency, apparently appropriation concerns exist for the 
respective part of the system. The best conditions to meet those concerns are created if 
the firm experiencing the highest sense of urgency imposes its requirements 
concerning time-to-market and creation of installed base upon the project 
management. Time-to-market and installed base are important conditions for 
appropriation (Teece, 1986; Schilling, 2002). We assume that that situation is created 
if the respective party has the highest involvement in the component development 
project.  
 We furthermore assume that the degree of uncertainty affects the optimal degree 
of integration in the innovation project. Under high uncertainty, the availability of 
different types of knowledge reduces transaction costs between the different parties, 
and thus a higher degree of integration will be more appropriate (Brusoni and 
Prencipe 2001; Tushman and Nadler, 1978; Wheelwright and Clark, 1992). Under 
conditions of low uncertainty, disintegrated organizational forms will be more 
efficient (Rindfleish and Heide, 1997; Worren, Moore and Cardona, 2002).  
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 To sum up, we assume that the relative division of urgency between the system 
and component developer affects the appropriate relative involvement of the two 
parties in the component development project, and that the combined degree of 
uncertainty involved in system and component development affect the appropriate 
degree of integration between the parties. 
 
The model 
 The considerations mentioned above can be translated into a typology for the most 
appropriate governance modes for component development projects under different 
conditions of newness of the system and component (Doty and Glick, 1994; Gerwin 
2004). The newer the system, the higher the system developer involvement and 
integration. The newer the component, the higher the component developer 
involvement and integration. In Figure 1 we present the typology (see also Van den 
Ende, 2003).
 
Figure 1. Model of Appropriate Governance Modes  
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  In quadrant I a mature component is adapted to a new system. The urgency for the 
system developer will be high, whereas the component developer will experience low 
urgency and will not be prepared to take high risks. Therefore the system developer 
should make the largest investments (system developer involvement is high). Because 
the uncertainty levels are intermediate, a moderate level of integration is expected to 
be appropriate. For instance, a mode of governance in which the system developer 
develops the system and finances the component development activities performed by 
a component developer in mutual coordination with the system developer, will fulfill 
these conditions. 
 In quadrant II both the system and the component are mature. The dominant 
design of the system has been established both in a technological sense and with 
respect to user preferences concerning applications and features. The component has 
proven to be successful and the component developer will generally be an established 
one. Neither the system developer nor the component developer will experience high 
urgency to introduce the component. As a solution they may share the costs and 
benefits. Technological and market uncertainty are low for both system and 
component. The development tasks are therefore relatively straightforward and the 
required degree of integration is low. A governance mode in which the system 
developer provides the system and the component developer performs the component 
development tasks fulfills these conditions best. 
 In quadrant III both the system and the component are new and as a result both 
technological and market uncertainty are high for both the system and the component. 
The development of the system and the component is highly interdependent in this 
quadrant. Since both the system developer and the component developer are expected 
to sense a high degree of urgency, they should share the costs and benefits in the 
component development project. Because of high uncertainty levels, high integration 
is expected to be most appropriate in this quadrant. An independent project 
organization is likely to provide the appropriate level of integration (Lorange and 
Roos, 1992: pp. 10-11). Another possibility is that the system developer develops the 
component within a separate unit internally, with some contribution of the component 
developer. 
 In quadrant IV, the component is completely new and the system is mature. Since 
the urgency for the system developer is low, the component developer can best 
finance the component completely by itself. The newness of the component may 
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require information on the system that is not readily available. The system developer 
may provide this information. A situation in which the component developer develops 
and finances the component, supported by dedicated information of the system 
developer, seems most appropriate in this quadrant. 
 
Misfit and performance 
 To summarize the theoretical considerations and the model presented above, we 
propose that the appropriate level of system developer involvement in component 
development projects is positively related to the system newness and negatively 
related to the component newness. Furthermore, we posit that the appropriate level of 
integration between the system developer and the component developer in a 
component development project is expected to increase with the combined newness of 
the system and the component. 
 We use the central idea from contingency theory that the degree of alignment 
between actual governance mode and appropriate governance mode affects 
performance (Naman and Slevin, 1993). We hypothesize that component development 
projects showing a misfit between the actual governance mode and the appropriate 
governance according to the newness contingencies suffer from sub-optimal 
appropriation and/or inefficiencies, resulting in disappointing project and market 
performance (see Figure 2).  
 
 
Figure 2. Governance misfit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Actual  
Governance Mode
Appropriate 
Governance Mode 
Performance 
Misfit 
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METHODOLOGY 
 
Sample and data collection 
 We empirically tested our ideas in the mobile telecommunications industry. In this 
empirical setting, as has been mentioned before, the system consists of the physical 
mobile telecommunications network and the middleware. Furthermore, we focused on 
mobile service development as the component development activity. The telecom 
operator is in this case the system developer, whereas the firm developing the mobile 
service is the component developer. Our sample consisted of thirty-five mobile 
service development projects that were executed in the Netherlands. Five projects did 
not appear to involve the development of a new service, but either the development of 
middleware or the redesign of an existing mobile service, and were therefore omitted 
from the analysis. The projects covered all five Dutch mobile telecom operators and 
numerous service firms, ranging from firms dedicated to mobile applications to firms 
with core activities in other markets, such as a retail bank. Furthermore, the dataset 
included projects covering a wide range of both services and technologies. At the time 
of study, most projects were completed less than a year ago. In terms of project size, 
the projects ranged from projects with fewer than five project members and lead times 
of less than a month to a project with over two hundred project members and another 
project taking over a year until completion.  
 The sample also varied regarding the level of telecom operator involvement. 
Fifteen projects were financed and executed by service firms without any involvement 
of a telecom operator. Twelve projects were financed and performed by a telecom 
operator in an alliance with a service firm. Three projects were completely financed 
by a telecom operator. We found the following number of projects in the four 
quartiles of figure 1: six projects in quadrant I, five in quadrant II, five in quadrant III 
and fourteen projects in quadrant IV.  
 We studied each project in a structured interview. From each project performed in 
a single firm at least one project manager completed the questionnaire. In our analysis 
the mean of the results was taken if more than one project manager was interviewed 
for a single project. During the interview, each project manager first completed the 
questionnaire in the presence of the interviewer. Next, discussions allowed us to test 
the validity of the questionnaire. This also improved our understanding of this 
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particular empirical setting. Moreover, the discussions enabled us to write a case 
description on each project that served to rate the degree of integration.  
  
Description of variables 
 We measured the variables in our conceptual framework using both four-point and 
five point scales. Prior exploratory case studies of mobile service development 
projects (Van den Ende, 2003) helped developing these scales. Network newness and 
service newness were each measured by a single item. To capture network newness 
we asked for the degree of standardization of the platform to which the mobile service 
was connected. This scale ranged from ‘no standardization’ to ‘a very high degree of 
standardization’. Platforms are middleware systems within mobile networks that 
support the implementation of mobile services. Newly introduced networks provide 
tailor-made interfaces to mobile services, whereas over time standard platforms 
emerge that manage the development and interconnection of services, such as i-mode. 
 Service newness was measured by asking for the newness of the service features 
to consumers. This scale ranged from ‘no new service features’ to ‘very new service 
features’. The absence of new service features indicated that the mobile service was a 
close copy of a service that was already being offered either in the mobile market or 
in other markets.  
 Telecom operator involvement was measured by the investments made by the 
telecom operator in the innovation project (Nooteboom, 1999: p. 67). This variable 
ranged from ‘no investments’ to ‘all investments’. The level of integration was 
measured on a five-point scale. A rate of 1 indicated the lowest level of integration 
and represents internal development of the mobile service by a service firm. This 
meant there was no organizational arrangement in place for the service firm to 
coordinate its activities with the middleware and/or network facilities. A rate of 2 
indicated that a service firm and a telecom operator cooperated to develop the service, 
with each of the partners performing their tasks internally. Consequently, this 
involved only a minor degree of integration between the service and the network 
development activities. Alliances between a service firm and a telecom operator were 
characterized by a rate of 3 when a dedicated service development unit included 
personnel from both partners. A rate of 4 represented internal service development by 
a telecom operator. However, within this firm, the service development tasks were 
performed in a unit without the direct involvement from personnel of the network or 
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middleware department. We are of the opinion that this organizational arrangement 
results in a higher level of integration than in any of the previous situations, since this 
internal solution minimally facilitates upstream coordination by the telecom operator 
(Gerwin, 2004) and lateral communication between the service development unit and 
the network department. The highest level of integration - indicated by a rate of 5 - 
referred to the situation where the telecom operator developed the service internally in 
a unit that integrated personnel from the network department in the service 
development task. We rated this five-point scale themselves using the information that 
was gathered during the interviews. Each of us rated the cases individually. A 
correlation of 0.70 resulted. Subsequently, we together agreed on the final rates. 
 Using the newness and the governance variables as described above, we 
operationalized our misfit propositions to test them empirically. In line with earlier 
considerations, we stated that the appropriate level of telecom operator involvement 
(Appropriate T) in mobile service development projects should increase with the 
network newness and decrease with the service newness (Formula 1). Furthermore, 
we posited that the appropriate level of integration of telecom operators in mobile 
service development projects (Appropriate I) should increase with the newness of 
both the network and the service (Formula 2).  
 In line with Naman and Slevin (1993) we calculated misfit as the absolute 
difference between the actual and the appropriate governance mode according to the 
newness considerations (Formulas 3 and 4). Since we assume that the performance 
implications are greater when both types of misfit are present, we defined total misfit 
(Misfit) as the product of the two dimensions of misfit (Formula 5). 
 
(1) Appropriate T  =  Network Newness – Service Newness 
(2) Appropriate I  =  Network Newness + Service Newness 
(3) Misfit T   =  | Actual T – Appropriate T | 
(4) Misfit I   =  | Actual I – Appropriate I | 
(5) Misfit   =  Misfit T * Misfit I 
 
 To investigate the performance implications of governance misfit, we measured 
two types of performance: project performance and market performance. Each type of 
performance was comprised of five items and measured the actual performance 
relative to expectations as perceived by the project managers. The lowest rate 
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represented very disappointing performance, a medium rate meant that the 
performance came up to expectations, and the highest rate indicated a performance 
level well beyond expectations. The items on project performance asked for 
judgments regarding (1) the efficiency of the project, (2) the budget performance of 
the project, (3) the quality of the project, (4) the time-to-market of the service, and (5) 
adherence to interim project deadlines. Varimax rotated principal axis factoring 
revealed two factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 that accounted for over seventy 
percent of total variance. The first factor clearly referred to the financial performance 
of the project (item 1 and 2). We therefore labeled this factor project efficiency 
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.6). The second factor related to the non-financial criteria for 
project performance (item 3, 4 and 5). We labeled this factor project timeliness 
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.7).  
 The market performance items asked for the degree to which the service could 
meet expectations regarding: (1) the number of users for the service, (2) revenues, (3) 
the growth of the service, (4) user satisfaction, and (5) the reliability of the service. A 
varimax rotated principal factor analysis revealed two common factors with 
eigenvalues greater than 1. These factors explained over seventy percent of total 
variance. The first factor, item 4 asking for user satisfaction, had a factor loading of 
0.8. This factor was therefore simply labeled as user satisfaction. The remaining four 
items formed the second factor. The item asking for reliability showed a relatively 
low factor loading however. We decided to remove this item from further analysis. 
This significantly improved the internal consistency for this factor and it increased the 
level of explained variance to over eighty percent. Furthermore, the three remaining 
items (items 1, 2, 3) clearly pointed toward the commercial performance of the 
service. Therefore we labeled this factor commercial performance (Cronbach’s alpha 
= 0.8). 
 
 
RESULTS 
 Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables described 
in the previous section. The table shows a high correlation (0.59) between the two 
dimensions of governance modes (telecom operator involvement and integration), but 
each variable reflects considerable unique information. Table 2 presents the results of 
the regression analyses. For each of the four performance constructs three regression 
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analyses were performed. Model 1 investigates the direct effects of telecom operator 
involvement and integration. In Model 2 we added the misfit measures related to the 
two governance mode dimensions in order to test whether these types of misfit 
negatively influence performance. Finally, in Model 3, we added the interaction term 
of the two types of misfit to test whether this combination has a negative effect on 
performance. To mitigate multicollinearity problems as a result of this interaction 
term, we mean-centered Misfit T and Misfit I. In the regression models most variance 
inflation factors were well below the value of 2.0 (which is below the acceptable 
value of 2.5). 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlations  
Pearson, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, N=30 (N=28 for correlations with 7. CP and 8. US), Cronbach Alpha on diagonal. 
 
 Model 1 significantly explains project efficiency, but shows no significant 
regression coefficients. Furthermore, Model 1 significantly explains project 
timeliness. This model indicates that telecom operator involvement is negatively 
related to the timeliness of mobile service development projects. This finding is 
significant, since it continues to appear after adding the misfit variables in Model 2 
and Model 3. This finding is in line with the expressions of many project managers 
from both service firms and telecom operators that decision-making within telecom 
operators involves many departments and delays the project’s execution. Telecom 
operator involvement also has a negative effect on commercial performance. This 
effect is weak since it only appears in Model 1. Apparently, the negative impact of 
telecom operator involvement on project timeliness is not reflected in a strong effect 
on the commercial performance of the projects. Finally, integration has a positive 
  Variable Mean Range S.D. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 
1. Network Newness  2.1 1.0 - 4.0 1.0         
2. Service Newness 2.9 1.0 - 4.0 0.9 -0.05        
3. Telco Involvement 2.1 1.0 - 5.0 1.4 -0.13 -0.10       
4. Integration 2.2 1.0 - 5.0 1.3 -0.07 -0.01 0.59**      
5. Project Efficiency 3.0 1.3 - 4.5 0.8 0.14 0.06 -0.40* -0.36 0.61    
6. Project Timeliness 2.9 1.5 - 4.5 0.7 0.08 -0.31 -0.54** -0.52** 0.35 0.73   
7. Commercial Performance 2.8 1.0 - 4.7 0.9 0.24 0.14 -0.33 -0.12 0.32 0.35 0.81  
8. User Satisfaction 3.6 2.0 – 5.0 0.9 -0.08 0.17 0.11 0.40* -0.11 -0.11 0.13  
9. Misfit T 1.1 0.0 – 3.7 0.9 0,25 -0,55** 0,29 -0,06 -0,13 0,07 -0,34 -0,27   
10. Misfit I 1.2 0.2 – 2.9 0.8 0,19 0,20 0,22 0,54** -0,27 -0,47** -0,22 0,19 -0,03  
11. Misfit 1.3 0.0 – 6.5 1.5 0,07 -0,27 0,47** 0,29 -0,38* -0,30 -0,56** -0,08 0,68** 0,54**
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effect on user satisfaction that persists in Model 2 and 3. As might be expected from 
the perspective of cross-functionality in innovation projects, this result shows that the 
combination of expertise on both the network and the service contributes to the extent 
that users are satisfied with the mobile service.  
 
Table 2. Regression results for the performance effects of governance and misfit  
 
                 PROJECT               PROJECT          COMMERCIAL                  USER  
         EFFICIENCYa           TIMELINESSa         PERFORMANCEb         SATISFACTIONb 
 
    1    2    3    1    2    3    1    2     3    1    2    3 
 
TELCO 
INVOLVEMENT  -0.16 -0.16 -0.09 -0.18* -0.26** -0.26** -0.28* -0.20 -0.01 -0.13 -0.06 -0.08 
 
INTEGRATION  -0.11 -0.07 -0.10 -0.17 -0.01 -0.01  0.09  0.14 -0.07  0.34**  0.31*  0.32* 
 
MISFIT T  -0.05 -0.11   0.15  0.15  -0.26 -0.45**  -0.19  -0.17 
 
MISFIT I  -0.15 -0.15  -0.31* -0.32*  -0.31 -0.37  -0.06 -0.06 
 
MISFIT   -0.25    0.00   -0.57**    0.07 
 
CONSTANT   3.56***  3.47***  3.39***  3.68***  3.50***  3.50***  3.16***  2.89***  2.62***  3.06***  2.98***   3.01*** 
 
 
F CHANGE   0.30  1.33   2.54*  0.00   1.50  5.15**   0.60  0.07 
 
F    2.95*  1.55  1.52  7.50***  5.44***  4.18***  1.73  1.65  2.59*  2.84*  1.68  1.30 
 
R²    0.18  0.20  0.24  0.36  0.47  0.47  0.12  0.22  0.37  0.19  0.23  0.23 
 
* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, a N=30, b N=28. 
 
 Adding the two types of governance misfit (Model 2) fails to significantly 
improve the explanation of project efficiency. Based on transaction cost 
considerations, we would particularly expect an effect of Misfit I on project 
efficiency, but we found no confirmation. However, the negative signs of the misfit 
coefficients do provide directional support for our assumptions. Model 2 does 
significantly improve the explanation of project timeliness. We find that Misfit I is 
negatively related to project timeliness. This indicates that a level of integration 
between the network and the service that does not correspond to the newness of the 
network and the service results in project delays. For example, a low level of 
integration for the development of a very new service on a new network is likely to 
result in a failure to meet time-to-market objectives. As we expected, in order to meet 
the market window, the integration of knowledge on the network in mobile service 
development projects becomes crucial under conditions of high newness for both the 
network and the service. Adding the two types of misfit (Model 2) does not 
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significantly improve the model with respect to commercial performance and user 
satisfaction.  
 Adding the interaction term between the two types of misfit in Model 3 improves 
the explanatory power of the model on commercial performance. Model 3 shows that 
a misfit in terms of telecom operator involvement significantly reduces commercial 
performance. One of the important assumptions behind our model was that system 
owner involvement is particularly important for reasons of appropriation. Since 
appropriation is primarily reflected in market performance, this finding corroborates 
this assumption. This finding involves that a high level of telecom operator 
involvement is most necessary for the development of relatively mature services for 
new networks. The high commercial success under these conditions shows that 
telecom operators can successfully attract new users for their networks by offering 
different services, and recoup the large investments. Furthermore we find a significant 
interaction term, supporting our expectation that a combination of the two types of 
misfit strongly reduces the commercial performance of mobile services.  
 We performed several additional regression analyses with a number of control 
variables. These variables failed to reach significance and were therefore not included 
in the models presented here. For example, the project performance indicators did not 
help explain the market performance indicators. Neither did the newness of the 
network and the newness of the service or the duration of the project help explain the 
performance constructs. Furthermore, the addition of too many explanatory variables 
would be problematic given our small sample. 
 We may conclude that the results show considerable support for our model. Misfit 
with respect to telecom operator involvement affects commercial performance of the 
projects, whereas misfit with respect to integration affects the direct project 
performance. The combined misfit affects commercial performance. We could not 
demonstrate effects of misfit on the other two performance measures, and the results 
show that there are several direct effects of telecom operator involvement and 
integration on performance. It means that the results show a partial confirmation of 
our contingency view of governance modes, and a partial confirmation of a view 
showing preference for specific governance modes, irrespective of the circumstances. 
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DISCUSSION 
 In this paper, based on life cycle considerations for the system and its components, 
we developed a framework for the most appropriate governance modes for component 
development of the larger system. The theoretical grounds for our expectations that 
specific governance modes have a positive impact on performance contingent on the 
newness of the system and components were mainly related to appropriation and 
transaction costs. We particularly postulated that, when the system was new relative 
to the component, system developer involvement had a positive effect on performance 
since it created better conditions for appropriation, and that, when the system and 
component were both new, integration had a positive effect on performance because it 
created better conditions to reduce transaction costs.  
 Our empirical study in the mobile telecommunications industry demonstrated 
several effects of governance misfit on project timeliness and commercial 
performance. We could not demonstrate an effect of misfit on project efficiency and 
user satisfaction. We also found several direct effects of governance mode on 
performance. In general, the results are in favor of a contingent approach of 
governance mode for component development for larger systems. 
 Our study faces several limitations as well. Firstly, the two measures for 
governance modes are conceptually very close and one of them was self-scored by the 
authors. More detailed and distinct multidimensional measures for organizational 
characteristics have to be developed. Moreover, and despite the fact that most of the 
single item scales measure fairly concrete objects and attributes (Rossiter, 2002), 
multi item scales and multiple respondents may provide more valid results, whereas a 
higher number of cases may provide more significant results. Secondly, in the case of 
mobile telecommunications, we considered the physical network and the middleware 
as one entity, the system. Since new middleware systems are sometimes developed for 
an existing network and existing middleware systems can operate on new networks, 
the network and the middleware can better be considered as two independent 
components, taking the middleware as indicative for the system. And thirdly, the 
financial situation in the mobile telecommunications industry forms a possible 
limitation of this research. Several cases in this study referred to periods in which the 
UMTS biddings in the telecom industry had not yet taken place. These biddings have 
severely deteriorated the cash position of telecom operators, leading to a decreasing 
ability of telecom operators to participate in service development projects. This may 
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have affected the degree of misfit in our sample, although we do not expect effects on 
the results with respect to the implications for performance. 
 In spite of these limitations, our paper makes some important contributions. In this 
paper we developed indicators of governance modes and mathematical representations 
of these indicators to be able to perform statistical analysis. Further work has to be 
done on this issue, which at the same time contributes to organization theory. 
Moreover, organization theory usually discusses organizational forms in relation to 
uncertainty and interdependency of tasks to be performed (Donaldson, 2001; 
Lawrence and Lorsch, 1976; Thompson, 1967). We included appropriation concerns 
as an determinant of organizational forms, which adds to the literature in this field. 
Moreover, the contingency approach is usually applied to the firm as a whole, 
whereas we apply a contingency approach to a specific process within one or more 
firms, the innovation process. This can also be done for other processes in the firm 
(Liker et al., 1999), and hence this study may also contribute to other areas of 
management studies.  
 Our results indicate several implications for the practice of system and component 
development as well. For instance, in the field of mobile telecommunications at this 
moment most telecom operators prefer to rely on the market for the development of 
services, since they themselves lack the required resources and capabilities, and since 
they are short of cash as a result of large investments in UMTS licenses and 
infrastructure. Our results show that under conditions of newness of the network, 
internal development or strong cooperative structures, may be more appropriate. A 
high degree of telecom operator involvement may be detrimental for timeliness of the 
project, but if in accordance with the newness, and if combined with a appropriate 
degree of integration, it is likely to render higher returns. For practitioners in other 
fields of systemic innovation, our results indicate that newness matters, particularly 
from a revenue perspective.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 In this study we tested a model for the most appropriate governance modes for 
component innovation, based on the life cycles of the system and component. The 
main purpose of this paper was to test whether the misfits between the governance 
modes as expected by us and actual governance modes had negative performance 
implications. We distinguished two elements of governance modes: the involvement 
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of the system developer relative to the component developer, and the level of 
integration. We tested the framework on thirty service development projects in the 
Dutch mobile telecommunications industry.  
 We find considerable support for our idea that system and component newness are 
important determinants of the organization of component development projects, in 
this case service development projects. Misfit significantly reduces project timeliness 
and commercial performance. Furthermore, we found that, irrespective of newness 
conditions, the degree of system developer involvement decreased project 
performance and that integration improved user satisfaction. 
 These results largely support the contingency approach reflected in our model, 
according to which governance modes have to be adapted to the specific phases in the 
life cycles of both system and component. For instance, this means that outsourcing of 
component development is not always the best alternative for a system developer. 
When the system is new relative to the component, a higher involvement of the 
system developer relative to the component developer positively affects performance, 
whereas a high degree of integration may positively affects performance when both 
system and component are new. Internal development of services becomes a serious 
option for the system developer under these circumstances, whereas outsourcing is 
better under more mature conditions. Such a view requires flexibility of firms 
operating in systemic markets to adapt organizational forms permanently to life cycle 
conditions. 
 This study implies for practitioners that performance requires a choice of 
governance mode in accordance with newness. Particularly, to increase market 
performance it may be beneficial to involve the system developer more than seems 
desirable at first sight. Disappointing effects of system developer involvement on 
project performance should not hide away the positive effects in the market. In the 
same way the degree of integration should be in line with newness conditions. Taking 
these contingencies into account might improve performance in one of the most 
difficult environments for innovation, the one of larger systems. 
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